Middle Powers’ New Playbook: Multipolarity’s Unintended Consequences

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Bishkek was a stark reminder of the seismic shift underway in the international order. The SCO’s condemnation of Iran’s military attacks and reaffirmation of its sovereignty were reassuring, but they also highlighted a crucial distinction: collective defence is not on offer from these alternative blocs.

The narrative surrounding multipolarity has long been that middle powers would find solace in joining organisations like BRICS and the SCO as a counterweight to Western dominance. However, recent events have exposed this assumption as flawed. The US-Israeli war on Iran made it clear that no amount of membership in these organisations can provide security guarantees equivalent to formal military alliances.

The emerging multipolar order is producing an increasingly complex web of relationships, where states are gaining diplomatic and economic options without acquiring new security guarantees. For middle powers, this means more room for manoeuvre but less certainty about who will stand beside them when their security is threatened.

Turkiye’s foreign policy strategy exemplifies this trend. Ankara maintains its NATO membership while expanding ties with Russia, China, and participating in the SCO as a dialogue partner. Its relationships are designed to provide flexibility, not security guarantees. By avoiding binary choices between Western and non-Western blocs, Turkiye preserves the ability to cooperate with multiple centres of influence.

Similarly, Brazil participates in BRICS, has an extensive economic relationship with China, and calls for reform of the international system. Brasília’s objective is not to exchange dependence on Washington for dependence on Beijing but to preserve its ability to cooperate with both and disagree with either. This approach allows Brazil to balance competing interests and priorities while maintaining relationships with the US and Europe.

India has made this logic an organising principle of its foreign policy, participating in the Quad while belonging to BRICS and the SCO. The Gulf Cooperation Council member states are pursuing their own version of diversification, expanding economic and diplomatic ties with China, India, and other Asian powers while maintaining their relationships with the US for security.

This trend suggests that middle and small powers are adapting to the emerging multipolar order by diversifying their relationships rather than seeking a single security guarantee. They want relationships with both Washington and Beijing because they’re preserving the ability to cooperate with multiple centres of influence, not abandoning one or the other.

As the international system becomes increasingly fragmented, middle powers will continue to navigate this complex landscape with caution. The multipolar order may have provided them with more room for manoeuvre, but it has also introduced a new level of uncertainty about who will stand beside them in times of crisis. Collective defence remains elusive in this emerging order.

The implications of this trend are far-reaching. If middle powers continue to diversify their relationships and avoid binary choices between Western and non-Western blocs, it could lead to a more nuanced understanding of security guarantees. Rather than relying on a single power or alliance for protection, states may come to value flexibility and adaptability in their international relationships.

In this emerging order, middle powers will need to be agile and responsive to changing circumstances. They must balance competing interests and priorities while preserving their ability to cooperate with multiple centres of influence. The stakes are high, but one thing is clear: security guarantees are no longer a given.